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Robust Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Discrete-Time Agents

  • Beijing Institute of Technology
  • Beijing Institute of Technology (Zhuhai)
  • Harbin Institute of Technology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

This paper investigates the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem of N players with discrete-time dynamics under jointly strongly connected switching networks. First, by integrating gradient play technique with a novel discrete-time distributed observer design, we develop a discretetime distributed Nash equilibrium seeking controller to solve the problem. Next, we establish two technical lemmas to analyze the uniform exponential stability of discrete-time linear switched systems. Then, we obtain the exponential stability of the interconnected closed-loop systems by constructing a Lyapunov function and providing a controller gain design method with the small gain arguments. Finally, the discrete-time distributed Nash equilibrium seeking is achieved over jointly strongly connected switching communication networks. The effectiveness of the developed approach is demonstrated by a numerical simulation example.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2026 IEEE 20th International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA 2026
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages2016-2021
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9798331548537
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2026
Event20th IEEE International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA 2026 - Almaty, Kazakhstan
Duration: 16 Jun 2026 → 19 Jun 2026

Publication series

NameIEEE International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA
ISSN (Print)1948-3449
ISSN (Electronic)1948-3457

Conference

Conference20th IEEE International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA 2026
Country/TerritoryKazakhstan
CityAlmaty
Period16/06/26 → 19/06/26

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