Abstract
This paper studies ordering and pricing issues under multiple times ordering. A manufacturer and a retailer are involved in our discussion. The deffnition of a reasonable price is given based on the practical requirement. First, we construct a Stackelberg model in which the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions respectively. During the process of derivation, both ordering time-points and optimal prices are expressed as functions of number of times of ordering. By solving a quadratic programming model with an undetermined parameter, we demonstrate that the optimal ordering time-points of the retailer are equidistant time points on the given selling period. Second, a cooperative model is developed in which the manufacturer and the retailer jointly make decisions. It is shown that the optimal retail price is than the noncooperative one.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3099-3111 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2021 |
Keywords
- Stackelberg game model
- centralized decision model
- equidistant time points
- inventory control
- phrases. Ordering and pricing
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Optimal Ordering And Pricing Models Of A Two-Echelon Supply Chain Under Multipletimes Ordering'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver