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On the Oscillations in Cournot Games with Best Response Strategies

  • Zhengyang Liu
  • , Haolin Lu
  • , Liang Shan*
  • , Zihe Wang
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • Beijing Institute of Technology
  • Renmin University of China

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the dynamic oscillation in the Cournot oligopoly model, which involves multiple firms producing homogeneous products. To explore the oscillation under the updates of best response strategies, we focus on the linear price functions. In this setting, we establish the existence of oscillations. In particular, we show that for the scenario of different costs among firms, the best response converges to either a unique equilibrium or a two-period oscillation. We further characterize the oscillations and propose linear-time algorithms for finding all types of two-period oscillations. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first step toward fully analyzing the periodic oscillation in the Cournot oligopoly model.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationComputing and Combinatorics - 31st International Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2025, Proceedings
EditorsFedor V. Fomin, Mingyu Xiao
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages320-332
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)9789819502141
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2026
Event31st International Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2025 - Chengdu, China
Duration: 15 Aug 202517 Aug 2025

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume15983 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference31st International Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2025
Country/TerritoryChina
CityChengdu
Period15/08/2517/08/25

Keywords

  • Best Response
  • Cournot Oligopoly Model
  • Oscillation

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