Abstract
Charging pile sharing transforms the structure of the supply chain and influences the production decisions of parking space operators. We develop three strategies to study parking space operators’ pile-building strategies using game theory: (1) commissioning a third-party company to build piles (Strategy P), (2) self-constructing charging piles (Strategy D), and (3) co-building and sharing charging piles with other operators (Strategy C). The results show that brand advantage has a negative effect on the low-brand operator in Strategies P and D but promotes revenue in Strategy C. Interestingly, the higher the brand advantage (or brand spillover) of the parking space operator, the smaller the fixed payment for the low-brand operator. Furthermore, operator L always has the lowest revenue in Strategy P. Finally, considering the maximization of social welfare, the government should provide parking space operator with a subsidy for building piles. These findings offer policy recommendations for parking space operators and the government to promote the implications related to facilitating sustainable transportation.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Article number | 104773 |
Journal | Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment |
Volume | 144 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2025 |
Keywords
- Charging pile
- Nash bargaining
- Parking space
- Sharing economy
- Sustainable transportation