TY - GEN
T1 - GIANT
T2 - 35th ACM Web Conference, WWW 2026
AU - Zhao, Jianjin
AU - Han, Dongqi
AU - Ma, Chao
AU - Li, Qi
AU - Cui, Zhiwei
AU - Zhu, Hongliang
AU - Zhang, Hua
AU - He, Mingshu
AU - Lu, Yijun
AU - Dong, Jiong
AU - Ma, Yuyin
AU - Shen, Meng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2026 Owner/Author.
PY - 2026/4/12
Y1 - 2026/4/12
N2 - Graph-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (GNIDS) have emerged as a promising solution by capturing sophisticated interaction patterns through inter-flow analysis. However, their robustness remains a critical yet unexplored issue. Despite efforts devoted to GNIDS robustness evaluation, most of them exclusively focus on feature attacks while neglecting topological vulnerabilities. Moreover, many studies either oversimplify the adversary by adopting random topology perturbations, or conversely assume unrealistic adversary's knowledge and capabilities, such as privileged network access or complete graph awareness. The lack of practical robustness evaluation severely hinders the deployment of GNIDS in real-world security applications. To fill this gap, we propose GIANT, a structure-agnostic practical adversarial attack framework for comprehensive robustness evaluation of GNIDS. Different from prior methods that perturb flow features or presuppose a fixed graph construction mode, GIANT injects extra adversarial network flows without altering existing traffic data to jointly manipulate graph topology and flow features, ensuring transferability across diverse GNIDS. Specifically, GIANT first transforms network flows into a hypothetical line graph and then performs a two-phase attack to determine adversarial flow endpoints and optimize adversarial flow features, balancing maximum adversarial impact and stealthiness. The iterative injection of adversarial flows induces erroneous decisions in the target GNIDS. Extensive experiments on two public datasets covering IoT and cloud environments validate GIANT's effectiveness, transferability, and efficiency against existing attack methods, providing a practical robustness evaluation solution for GNIDS, and offering critical insights into their fundamental vulnerabilities.
AB - Graph-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (GNIDS) have emerged as a promising solution by capturing sophisticated interaction patterns through inter-flow analysis. However, their robustness remains a critical yet unexplored issue. Despite efforts devoted to GNIDS robustness evaluation, most of them exclusively focus on feature attacks while neglecting topological vulnerabilities. Moreover, many studies either oversimplify the adversary by adopting random topology perturbations, or conversely assume unrealistic adversary's knowledge and capabilities, such as privileged network access or complete graph awareness. The lack of practical robustness evaluation severely hinders the deployment of GNIDS in real-world security applications. To fill this gap, we propose GIANT, a structure-agnostic practical adversarial attack framework for comprehensive robustness evaluation of GNIDS. Different from prior methods that perturb flow features or presuppose a fixed graph construction mode, GIANT injects extra adversarial network flows without altering existing traffic data to jointly manipulate graph topology and flow features, ensuring transferability across diverse GNIDS. Specifically, GIANT first transforms network flows into a hypothetical line graph and then performs a two-phase attack to determine adversarial flow endpoints and optimize adversarial flow features, balancing maximum adversarial impact and stealthiness. The iterative injection of adversarial flows induces erroneous decisions in the target GNIDS. Extensive experiments on two public datasets covering IoT and cloud environments validate GIANT's effectiveness, transferability, and efficiency against existing attack methods, providing a practical robustness evaluation solution for GNIDS, and offering critical insights into their fundamental vulnerabilities.
KW - adversarial attacks
KW - graph neural networks
KW - network intrusion detection systems
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105038566859
U2 - 10.1145/3774904.3792601
DO - 10.1145/3774904.3792601
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105038566859
T3 - WWW 2026 - Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2026
SP - 3347
EP - 3357
BT - WWW 2026 - Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2026
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
Y2 - 29 June 2026 through 3 July 2026
ER -