Evolutionary game analysis of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain with asymmetric information

Jian Li; Weihao Du; Fengmei Yang; Guowei Hua

doi:10.3390/su6096312

Evolutionary game analysis of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain with asymmetric information

Jian Li
, Weihao Du
, Fengmei Yang
, Guowei Hua^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Beijing University of Chemical Technology
Li and Fung Limited
Beijing Jiaotong University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

33 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Remanufacturing is an effective means to realize energy saving and emission reduction. This paper develops an evolutionary game model with a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of manufacturers and retailers. Through analyzing evolutionary path of the game, we find that there are two possible evolutionary results affected by the profits of manufacturers. Price of remanufacturing products may be a critical factor that determines the ESS. Government subsidy is critical to promote the development of remanufacturing industry.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	6312-6324
Number of pages	13
Journal	Sustainability (Switzerland)
Volume	6
Issue number	9
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3390/su6096312
Publication status	Published - 2014
Externally published	Yes

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy
SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure

Keywords

Closed-loop supply chain
Evolutionary game
Evolutionary stable strategies
Government subsidy
Remanufacturing

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10.3390/su6096312

Cite this

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title = "Evolutionary game analysis of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain with asymmetric information",

abstract = "Remanufacturing is an effective means to realize energy saving and emission reduction. This paper develops an evolutionary game model with a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of manufacturers and retailers. Through analyzing evolutionary path of the game, we find that there are two possible evolutionary results affected by the profits of manufacturers. Price of remanufacturing products may be a critical factor that determines the ESS. Government subsidy is critical to promote the development of remanufacturing industry.",

keywords = "Closed-loop supply chain, Evolutionary game, Evolutionary stable strategies, Government subsidy, Remanufacturing",

author = "Jian Li and Weihao Du and Fengmei Yang and Guowei Hua",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2014 by the authors.",

year = "2014",

doi = "10.3390/su6096312",

language = "English",

volume = "6",

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AU - Li, Jian

AU - Du, Weihao

AU - Yang, Fengmei

AU - Hua, Guowei

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Remanufacturing is an effective means to realize energy saving and emission reduction. This paper develops an evolutionary game model with a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of manufacturers and retailers. Through analyzing evolutionary path of the game, we find that there are two possible evolutionary results affected by the profits of manufacturers. Price of remanufacturing products may be a critical factor that determines the ESS. Government subsidy is critical to promote the development of remanufacturing industry.

AB - Remanufacturing is an effective means to realize energy saving and emission reduction. This paper develops an evolutionary game model with a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of manufacturers and retailers. Through analyzing evolutionary path of the game, we find that there are two possible evolutionary results affected by the profits of manufacturers. Price of remanufacturing products may be a critical factor that determines the ESS. Government subsidy is critical to promote the development of remanufacturing industry.

KW - Closed-loop supply chain

KW - Evolutionary game

KW - Evolutionary stable strategies

KW - Government subsidy

KW - Remanufacturing

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84907168733

U2 - 10.3390/su6096312

DO - 10.3390/su6096312

M3 - Article

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JO - Sustainability (Switzerland)

JF - Sustainability (Switzerland)

IS - 9

ER -

Evolutionary game analysis of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain with asymmetric information

Abstract

UN SDGs

Keywords

Access to Document

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