Environmental Policies within Cournot Oligopoly

  • Liang Shan
  • , Zhengyang Liu
  • , Haoqaing Huang
  • , Zihe Wang*
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We consider how to effectively regulate environmental policies with clear penalties and rewards, through a game-theoretical point of view. To this end, we use social welfare as the primary metric for evaluation. We demonstrate that the best possible social welfare can be achieved through policies that incorporate both linear taxation and subsidies in a Cournot competition model. To make it constructive, we propose efficient algorithms to find optimal policies in a Cournot competition model. Our work can be seen as the first step towards obtaining the optimal environmental policy through the lens of computation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2025
EditorsYevgeniy Vorobeychik, Sanmay Das, Ann Nowe
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages2738-2740
Number of pages3
ISBN (Electronic)9798400714269
Publication statusPublished - 2025
Event24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2025 - Detroit, United States
Duration: 19 May 202523 May 2025

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2025
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityDetroit
Period19/05/2523/05/25

Keywords

  • Cournot Game
  • Environmental Policies
  • Social Welfare

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