Diversity of payment contracts in a decentralized assembly system

Guo Li, Mengqi Liu, Xu Guan*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Conventional wisdom views that in an assembly system, suppliers have to accept a unified payment contract when transacting with a manufacturer. However, in practice, the implementation of a payment contract is clearly more dependent on the channel power of the supplier in the supply chain. This paper considers an assembly system consisting of two suppliers with different channel powers, and identifies three payment contracts, namely, on-delivery payment, on-agreed-time payment, and ready-to-assemble payment. We investigate the equilibrium delivery and timing decisions of firms under three different cases distinguished by the combinations of different payment contracts in the system. Based on both theoretical and quantitative analyses, three major results are obtained. First, the delivery times of suppliers are cost-driven and time-related. Second, the buffer time of the manufacturer can balance the production lead times of the supplier. Third, the supply chain achieves the lowest cost when the core supplier chooses an on-agreed-time payment contract, and the general supplier adopts a ready-to-assemble payment contract.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)613-639
    Number of pages27
    JournalAnnals of Operations Research
    Volume257
    Issue number1-2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2017

    Keywords

    • Assembly system
    • Comparative analysis
    • Game theory
    • Payment contracts

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