Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking with Communication Delays

Lupeng Liu, Maobin Lu*, Fang Deng, Lihua Dou, Jie Chen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium seeking in N-player games for single inte-grator dynamics subject to strongly connected networks and communication delays. First, we propose a distributed estimator for each player, enabling them to estimate the actions of all players. Notably, we take into account unknown bounded time delays that occur during communication between players and their neighbors. Next, we design a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking law using the gradient play technique. Then, we analyze the stability of the closed-loop system, which consists of an interconnected nonlinear subsystem and a linear time-delay subsystem. By means of designing the Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional, we demonstrate that Nash equilibrium seeking is achieved at an exponential rate, even in the presence of unknown and bounded communication delays. Finally, we provide a simulation example to illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2024 IEEE 18th International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA 2024
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages6-11
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9798350354409
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2024
Event18th IEEE International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA 2024 - Reykjavik, Iceland
Duration: 18 Jun 202421 Jun 2024

Publication series

NameIEEE International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA
ISSN (Print)1948-3449
ISSN (Electronic)1948-3457

Conference

Conference18th IEEE International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA 2024
Country/TerritoryIceland
CityReykjavik
Period18/06/2421/06/24

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