Distributed Convergence to Nash Equilibria in a Zero-Sum Resource Allocation Game

Jie Hou, Xianlin Zeng*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of how to allocate multiple defensive resources to protect multiple sites from possible attacks, which is formulated by a zero-sum resource allocation game with inequality constraints. The considered two classes of players (defenders and attackers) have opposite objectives for a common linear objective function. We put forward a distributed continuous-time algorithm for such problems, and provide a rigorous proof of convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In the end, the efficacy and correctness of our method are illustrated via a numerical example.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of 2023 7th Chinese Conference on Swarm Intelligence and Cooperative Control - Swarm Optimization Technologies
EditorsYongzhao Hua, Yishi Liu, Liang Han
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages77-88
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)9789819733231
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2024
Event7th Chinese Conference on Swarm Intelligence and Cooperative Control, CCSICC 2023 - Nanjing, China
Duration: 24 Nov 202327 Nov 2023

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Electrical Engineering
Volume1203 LNEE
ISSN (Print)1876-1100
ISSN (Electronic)1876-1119

Conference

Conference7th Chinese Conference on Swarm Intelligence and Cooperative Control, CCSICC 2023
Country/TerritoryChina
CityNanjing
Period24/11/2327/11/23

Keywords

  • defender-attacker game
  • distributed algorithm
  • Nash equilibria
  • resource allocation
  • zero-sum game

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