Complex dynamics analysis for a Bertrand duopoly model with bounded rationality

Ji Xiang Zhang*, De Qun Zhou, Yan Hua Wang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A dynamic of Bertrand duopoly game is analyzed, where players use different production methods and choose their prices with bounded rationality. The equilibriums of the corresponding discrete dynamical systems are investigated. The stability conditions of Nash equilibrium under a local adjustment process are studied. The stability conditions of Nash equilibrium under a local adjustment process are studied. The stability of Nash equilibrium, as some parameters of the model are varied, gives rise to complex dynamics such as cycles of higher order and chaos. On this basis, we discover that an increase of adjustment speed of bounded rational player can make Bertrand market sink into the chaotic state. Finally, the complex dynamics, bifurcations and chaos are displayed by numerical simulation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2009 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering - 16th Annual Conference Proceedings, ICMSE 2009
Pages190-195
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes
Event2009 16th International Conference on Management Science and Engineering, ICMSE 2009 - Moscow, Russian Federation
Duration: 14 Sept 200916 Sept 2009

Publication series

Name2009 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering - 16th Annual Conference Proceedings, ICMSE 2009

Conference

Conference2009 16th International Conference on Management Science and Engineering, ICMSE 2009
Country/TerritoryRussian Federation
CityMoscow
Period14/09/0916/09/09

Keywords

  • Bertrand duopoly model
  • Discrete dynamical system
  • Heterogeneous expectations
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Stability

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