Adjustment effect of voluntary disclosure to executive intensity and performance volatility: Evidence from NEEQ in China

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Abstract

This paper empirically tests the adjustment effect from the voluntary disclosure level of the company on the relationship between the executive power intensity and the company performance volatility based on the NEEQ from China. The result shows that the higher the executive power intensity is, the higher the company performance and the greater corporate performance volatility will be; the improvement of executive power has “mixed advantages and disadvantages” for the NEEQ Market and the improvement of the level of voluntary information disclosure can weaken the impact of executive power intensity on the company performance volatility. This research enriches the cognition of the NEEQ, and tries to provide theoretical support for relevant regulatory authorities to standardize the voluntary disclosure of NEEQ.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Computers in Management and Business, ICCMB 2018
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages49-53
Number of pages5
ISBN (Print)9781450364232
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 25 May 2018
Event2018 International Conference on Computers in Management and Business, ICCMB 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom
Duration: 25 May 201827 May 2018

Publication series

NameACM International Conference Proceeding Series

Conference

Conference2018 International Conference on Computers in Management and Business, ICCMB 2018
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityOxford
Period25/05/1827/05/18

Keywords

  • Company performance volatility
  • Executive power intensity
  • Voluntary information disclosure

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