TY - GEN
T1 - A study of signaling game and its Bayesian equilibrium in CRM
AU - Yin, Q. J.
AU - Gan, R. C.
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - The paper applies the analysis method of the signaling game into the Customer Relationship Management (CRM). Based on the bi-direction information transmitted in the CRM, the signaling game model of business-customer is established, which is represent by six factors, such as advertisement input level, product price, service level, consultation input level, purchase quantity and satisfactory degree. The model focuses on the equilibrium activities of the business and customer in the environment of CRM. The Bayesian equilibrium of the model is obtained by applying Backwards Induction.
AB - The paper applies the analysis method of the signaling game into the Customer Relationship Management (CRM). Based on the bi-direction information transmitted in the CRM, the signaling game model of business-customer is established, which is represent by six factors, such as advertisement input level, product price, service level, consultation input level, purchase quantity and satisfactory degree. The model focuses on the equilibrium activities of the business and customer in the environment of CRM. The Bayesian equilibrium of the model is obtained by applying Backwards Induction.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33845477044&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICEBE.2005.17
DO - 10.1109/ICEBE.2005.17
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:33845477044
SN - 0769524303
SN - 9780769524306
T3 - Proceedings - ICEBE 2005: IEEE International Conference on e-Business Engineering
SP - 381
EP - 386
BT - Proceedings - ICEBE 2005
T2 - ICEBE 2005: IEEE International Conference on e-Business Engineering
Y2 - 18 October 2005 through 21 October 2005
ER -