TY - JOUR
T1 - A Preference Value-Based Reverse Auction Mechanism for Satellite-Assisted Integrated Communication and Jamming System in IoT
AU - Tian, Wen
AU - Dong, Xueke
AU - Pan, Gaofeng
AU - Pan, Chengsheng
AU - Nie, Jiangtian
AU - Han, Zhu
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 IEEE. All rights reserved,
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - —The channel allocation is an important supporting technology in the Internet of Things (IoT), especially in dealing with self-interference and inner communication in wireless confrontation, which is also a critical issue for satellite-assisted integrated communication and jamming system (SICJS) that needs to be considered urgently. However, existing works mainly focus on the cooperation between a single friendly jammer and inner communication users which cannot deal with multiple friendly jammers and inner communication users simultaneously in SICJS. Therefore, we propose a preference value-based lopsided matching reverse auction (PVLMRA) in this article to allocate the channels rationally and obtain the optimal revenue for the inner communication users. In the proposed PVLMRA, a trading is established among the inner communication users, friendly jammers, and satellites. Specifically, users submit the requirements for communication channels, and friendly jammers are encouraged to release jammed channels to meet the requirements, with satellites providing relay service to help complete the trading. Extensive contrast simulations and mathematical proofs demonstrate that the proposed PVLMRA method is computationally effective, truthful, and individual rational, while guaranteeing the revenue of inner users.
AB - —The channel allocation is an important supporting technology in the Internet of Things (IoT), especially in dealing with self-interference and inner communication in wireless confrontation, which is also a critical issue for satellite-assisted integrated communication and jamming system (SICJS) that needs to be considered urgently. However, existing works mainly focus on the cooperation between a single friendly jammer and inner communication users which cannot deal with multiple friendly jammers and inner communication users simultaneously in SICJS. Therefore, we propose a preference value-based lopsided matching reverse auction (PVLMRA) in this article to allocate the channels rationally and obtain the optimal revenue for the inner communication users. In the proposed PVLMRA, a trading is established among the inner communication users, friendly jammers, and satellites. Specifically, users submit the requirements for communication channels, and friendly jammers are encouraged to release jammed channels to meet the requirements, with satellites providing relay service to help complete the trading. Extensive contrast simulations and mathematical proofs demonstrate that the proposed PVLMRA method is computationally effective, truthful, and individual rational, while guaranteeing the revenue of inner users.
KW - Auction mechanism
KW - channel allocation
KW - cooperative jamming
KW - satellite-assisted
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105019693359
U2 - 10.1109/JIOT.2025.3623252
DO - 10.1109/JIOT.2025.3623252
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:105019693359
SN - 2327-4662
VL - 12
SP - 55316
EP - 55329
JO - IEEE Internet of Things Journal
JF - IEEE Internet of Things Journal
IS - 24
ER -