Abstract
Considering different preferences of consumers on battery charging and swapping modes, this paper develops a tripartite game model from the perspective of electric vehicle manufacturers and a third-party investor of the battery-swapping stations. The mechanism of electricity price and investment decisions is revealed. Three decision variables are incorporated into a three-level Stackelberg model which include the investment level and two types of prices. The optimal pricing and investment strategies can then be obtained through the proposed model. The sensitivity analysis is also performed on the optimal pricing and investment strategy factors that affect the electric vehicle market demand and the battery-swapping modes. The study also investigates the impact of the cooperation mode between a manufacturer and a third-party investor of the battery-swapping stations on the optimal pricing and investment strategies. The results indicate that the cooperation of a manufacturer and a third-party investor would reduce the profit of their competitor (for example, the manufacturer of charging electric vehicles). When there is no cooperation established between a manufacturer and a third-party investor, the investment and constructions would be affected by the profit-sharing ratio of the battery-swapping mode, which causes the underinvestment or overinvestment problems.
Translated title of the contribution | Pricing and Investment Strategies for Electric Vehicle Battery Charging and Swapping |
---|---|
Original language | Chinese (Traditional) |
Pages (from-to) | 183-189 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | Jiaotong Yunshu Xitong Gongcheng Yu Xinxi/ Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology |
Volume | 21 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2021 |
Externally published | Yes |