Coopetition between LTE unlicensed and Wi-Fi: A reverse auction with allocative externalities

Haoran Yu, George Iosifidis, Jianwei Huang, Leandros Tassiulas

科研成果: 书/报告/会议事项章节会议稿件同行评审

3 引用 (Scopus)

摘要

Motivated by the recent efforts in extending LTE to the unlicensed spectrum, we propose a novel spectrum sharing framework for the coopetition (i.e., cooperation and competition) between LTE and Wi-Fi in the unlicensed band. Basically, the LTE network chooses to work in one of the two modes: in the competition mode, it randomly accesses an unlicensed channel, and interferes with a Wi-Fi access point; in the cooperation mode, it onloads a Wi-Fi access point's traffic in exchange for the full access of the corresponding channel. Because the LTE network works in an interference-free manner in the cooperation mode, it can achieve a much larger total data rate (comparing to the competition mode) to serve both its own users and the Wi-Fi users under proper channel conditions. To achieve the maximum potential of this novel coopetition framework, we design a reverse auction mechanism, where the LTE provider is the auctioneer (buyer), and the Wi-Fi access point owners (APOs) are the bidders who compete to sell their channels to the LTE provider. An APO's bid indicates the data rate that it would like the LTE provider to offer in the cooperation mode. We show that the auction involves the allocative externalities, i.e., the cooperation between the LTE provider and an APO benefits other APOs who are not directly involved in this cooperation. As a result, a particular APO's bidding strategy is affected by its belief about other APOs' bidding strategies. This makes our analysis much more challenging than that of the standard second-price auction, where bidding truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy. We characterize the APOs' unique equilibrium bidding strategies, and analyze the LTE provider's optimal reserve rate that maximizes its payoff for a general APO type distribution. Our analysis shows that only when the LTE throughput exceeds a threshold, the LTE provider will choose a reasonably large reserve rate to cooperate with the APOs; otherwise, it will restrict the reserve rate to a small value and work in the competition mode.

源语言英语
主期刊名2016 14th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2016
出版商Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN(电子版)9781509013111
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 15 6月 2016
已对外发布
活动14th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2016 - Tempe, 美国
期限: 9 5月 201613 5月 2016

出版系列

姓名2016 14th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2016

会议

会议14th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2016
国家/地区美国
Tempe
时期9/05/1613/05/16

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