Abstract
We study the cooperation of the mobile network operator (MNO) and the venue owners (VOs) on the public Wi-Fi deployment. We consider a one-to-many bargaining framework, where the MNO bargains with VOs sequentially to determine where to deploy Wi-Fi and how much to pay. Taking into account the negative externalities among different steps of bargaining, we analyze the following two cases: for the exogenous bargaining sequence case, we compute the optimal bargaining solution on the cooperation decisions and payments under a predetermined bargaining sequence; for the endogenous bargaining sequence case, the MNO decides the bargaining sequence to maximize its payoff. Through exploring the structural property of the optimal bargaining sequence, we design a low-complexity Optimal VO Bargaining Sequencing (OVBS) algorithm to search the optimal sequence. More specifically, we categorize the VOs into three types based on the impact of the Wi-Fi deployment at their venues, and show that it is optimal for the MNO to bargain with these three types of VOs sequentially. Numerical results show that compared with the random and worst bargaining sequences, the optimal bargaining sequence improves the MNO's payoff by up to 14.8 and 45.3 percent, respectively.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 7539609 |
Pages (from-to) | 1559-1572 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing |
Volume | 16 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Nash bargaining
- Wi-Fi deployment
- venue owner